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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OFUTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. 
. _ Case No. 
vs
~
 :
 14322 
THAYNE LARRY WALKER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with burglary, a violation 
of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-202 (1975), and theft, a 
violation of Utah Code Annotated, § 76-7-404 (1975). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was convicted by a jury of the crimes 
of Burglary and Theft on October 2, 1975, before Honorable 
Peter F. Leary, in the Third District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Appellant was sentenced 
to serve one to fifteen years and zero to one years 
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as provided by the law. The sentences are to run 
concurrently with each other and with others he is 
presently serving. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the conviction 
of appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the afternoon of July 21, 1975, Deputy 
Shefiff Mike Hanks was holding surveillance on an 
apartment in Salt Lake City, Utah. From his position 
he observed appellant and Robert Davis leave the 
apartment. Hanks then lost sight of the two when 
they went around a building (T-37). Hanks then got in 
his patrol car hoping to relocate the pair. About ten 
to twelve minutes later he again observed the two in a 
volkswagon van, driven by appellantf in the driveway of 
another apartment building (T-37). Hanks drove past 
the driveway and waved to Davis who he knew. 
Davis waved back CT~7). Hanks then pulled over to 
allow the van to pass but instead it pulled up behind 
his patrol car (T-38). 
Davis jumped out of the van and walked 
quickly towards the patrol car as Hanks got out (Suppres 
7, 8). During a brief conversation Davis stated 
he had been visiting a friend in the apartment (T-8). 
Hanks asked appellant for his driver's license and he 
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removed it from his shoe (Supp. hearing p. 9). Hanks 
determined that the license was valid and then asked ap-
pellant if he had recently been arrested in Price, 
knowing already that he had been (Supp. hearing p. 10). 
Walker initially denied the arrest but then admitted 
it when he found that Hanks already knew (Supp. hearing 
p. 11). About this time Deputy Hanks observed stereo 
equipment in the back of the van (T-39). When Davis 
noticed that Hanks saw the equipment, he stated that 
he didn't know anything about any stereo equipement 
(T-37,60). This was a totally unsolicited remark by 
Davis. Deputy Hanks then went to his car and radioed 
for an additional officer. When Officer Crockett 
arrived Hanks told him to watch the two while he checked 
the nearby apartments where the pair had come from 
(T-4 0). Deputy Hanks very shortly discovered an apart-
ment with a door open. Splinters of wood were laying 
about and pry marks were visible on the door (T-42). 
On looking inside the apartment, Hanks observed pictures 
In all fairness to appellant, it should be noted 
that at the suppression hearing Officer Hanks testified 
that he called for additional help prior to the time 
when he noticed the stereo equipment. This point was 
not developed through cross-examination by Davis. Of 
course, during the suppression hearing Officer Hanks may 
have become confused since he testified of two separate calls 
over his radio, the first for validation of Walker's driver's 
license and the second for another officer to come. 
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and lamps lying about as if the place had been ransacked 
(T-42). 
Deputy Hanks then returned to the van and placed 
appellant and Davis under arrest (T-63). After obtaining 
a search warrant for the van, Hanks recovered stereo 
equipment, a piggy bank, and other items from the 
burgalized apartment (T-43). Still later, pursuant to 
another search warrant, Hanks obtained two 1972 
Eisenhower Silver Dollars from Davis1 personal effects 
at the jail. The dollars were from the apartment. 
ARGUMENT 
The issues raised in Thayne Larry Walker's appeal 
have already been considered and disposed of by this Court. 
Walker's co-defendant, Robert Charles Davis unsuccessfully 
litigated those points in State v. Robert Charles Davis, 
Utah Supremo Court No. 14313, August 24, 1976. It is 
Respondent's position that the Davis case is dispositive of 
appellant Walker's appeal. However, a respondent's brief 
is being submitted in the event this Court chooses to re-
consider the points raised by the appellant. 
POINT I 
OFFICER HANKS1 INVESTIGATION OF APPELLANT WAS 
ENTIRELY REASONABLE AND CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE. 
Appellant was convicted of burglary and theft for 
breaking into an apartment in Salt Lake City, Utah (T-212). 
Appellant does not allege on appeal that a burglary was not 
committed or that the evidence at trial was insufficient 
as to him being the perpetrator. Instead, he seeks reversal Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of his conviction solely on the basis that it resulted 
from the use of evidence which was allegedly obtained 
during an illegal detention by a police officer. 
Respondent submits that the Officer's brief 
detention of appellant was reasonable and permissible 
under the circumstances. 
Before examining the facts it is important to note 
that this same issue was raised at a suppression hearing. 
The Honorable Peter Leary determined, after examining 
all evidence, that the peace officer acted properly. It 
is well established in Utah that the findings of the trial 
court are presumed to be correct and that the ruling will 
not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that there was 
error. State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 
517 (1968), reaffirmed in State v. Torres, 29 Utah 2d 
269, 508 P.2d 534, 536 (1973). Respondent submits that 
there was no error at all, let alone a "clear" error. 
There are three basic areas of interaction between 
private citizens and the police. These may be referred 
to as (a) casual interaction, (b) stops or momentary de-
tentions and (c) formal or complete arrest. It is important 
to note the differences of the three areas in two aspects, 
(1) the amount of force exerted by the police, and (2) the 
circumstances which authorize that use of force. 
a. Casual interaction 
Casual interaction is a situation where no force 
is exerted by the officer. The citizen is free to end 
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the encounter at all times. Since no rights are infringed 
the officer need not show any basis at all for the 
interaction. Examples include situations in which 
officers meet acquaintances on the street and make 
small talk, or where an officer asks a person, "have 
you heard. . . •", "do you know anything about. • . • " , 
or "What is going on." In Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1 20 L.Ed2d 889, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), the 
Supreme Court of the United States recognized this 
type of interaction: 
"Obviously, not all personal 
intercourse between police and citizens 
involves fseizures of persons.1 Only 
I when the officer, by means of physical 
force or show of authority has in 
some way restrained the liberty of 
a citizen may we conclude that a 
'seizure1 has occured." 20 L.ed2d 
at 905, fn. 16. 
Obviously, this type of interaction can be initiated 
by either the police or the citizen such as when a 
man comes up to a policeman and voluntarily begins 
a conversation. 
b#
 Stops or Momentary Detentions 
This involves the typical "stop" or "stop 
and frisk" situation where an officer briefly stops 
an individual to get information from him concerning 
his actions. Here the individual is not free to leave. 
In other words, physical force or a show of authority 
is involved. Because of this, such a situation is 
impermissible unless the officer has a reasonable and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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good faith belief, based upon articulable facts, that 
his actions are warranted. See Terry v. Ohio, supra. 
Thus, Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-33 (1975), provides: 
"A peace officer may stop any 
person in a public place whom he 
has probable cause to believe: 
1) is in the act of committing 
a crime; 
2) has committed a crime; or 
3) is attempting to commit a 
crime; 
and may demand of him his name, 
address and an explanation of his 
actions. 
Likewise, the United States Supreme Court holds: 
"A brief stop of a suspicious 
individual, in order to determine 
his identity or to maintain the 
status quo momentarily while obtaining 
more information, may be most reason-
able in light of the facts known to 
the officer at the time. Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 32 L.ed2d 612 
92 S.Ct. 1921 (1972). 
See also State v. Torres, Utah, supra. Obviously, in 
the "stop" situation the officer need not have the 
extensive probable cause required to make an arrest. 
Rather, the brief detention is an "intermediate response" 
so that "a policeman who lacks. . . probable cause to 
arrest [need not] shrug his shoulders and allow a 
crime to occur or a criminal to escape." Adams v. 
Williams, supra. 
c. Complete arrest. 
In this situation, the officer uses sufficient 
force to entirely curtail the liberty of the person 
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arrested. This greater use of authority must be based 
on stronger or more incriminating circumstances than 
would authorize the "stop11 or brief detention. The 
term generally used for the authorization to arrest 
is "probable cause"; derived from the Fourth Amendment 
of the Constitution. Henry v. United States, 3 61 U.S. 
98, 4 L.Ed2d 134, 80 S.Ct. 168 (1959). However, other 
terms have been used to connote the same thing. Thus, 
some statutes and judicial decisions use such terms 
as "reasonable cause," "reasonable ground," "reasonable 
belief", or "sufficient cause." All such terms are 
ordinarily intended to mean "probable cause" within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Draper v. United 
States, 358 U.S. 307, 3 L.Ed2d 327, 79 S.Ct. 329 (1959).2 
In describing the three major types of police-
citizen interaction it should be noted that they are 
Appellant would have this court engage in 
a dispute based on semantics. He points out that the 
Utah statute authorizing a stop and frisk, section 77-13-33, 
requires "probable cause" while the arrest statute, section 
77-13-3, requests only "reasonable cause." Appellant 
suggests that the legislature intended a detention to 
be prohibited except on more highly incriminating 
circumstances than required for an arrest. Respondent 
submits that appellant's position is entirely illogical 
and contrary to the best interests of the public. Further-
more, the intent of the legislature in enacting the deten-
tion statute is made manifest by the very title of the 
act: "An act providing a peace officer with authority 
to detain a suspect temporarily for questioning and 
search him for dangerous weapons where good cause appears." 
See Laws of Utah 1967, Chap. 203, p. 559. 
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all part of a sliding scale. That is, all detentions 
and arrests involve varying degrees of force - the 
amount of force dependant on the circumstances. For 
this reason, the United States Supreme Court has 
fashioned the rule that in justifying any intrusion, 
the officer must point to facts which, taken together 
with rational inferences, reasonably warrant that 
particular intrusion, Terry v. Ohio, supra. 
Obviously, one incident between an officer 
and an individual may involve all three of the above 
catagories. For example, an officer may initiate 
a conversation and the individual begins to act 
suspiciously* The officer may then detain the 
individual forcefully to get further information. 
If that information is incriminating, the officer may 
then effect an arrest. 
Respondent submits that the present case is 
an example of just such a situation. The inter-
action between Officer Hanks and appellant began with 
absolutely no force involved on the officer's part 
and complete liberty to leave on appellant's part. 
However, appellant acted suspiciously and gave the 
officer cause to detain him briefly while more in-
formation was gathered. Finally, with full probable 
-.9-
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cause, appellant was arrested for the crime of which 
he now stands convicted. 
The record indicates that the officer had 
appellant under surveillance and 1 ost sight of 
him for a few minutes. Thereafter, Officer Hanks 
saw appellant in the driveway of an apartment com-
plex (T-37). Officer Hanks had previously arrested Davis, 
a passenger in the van appellant was driving, for the 
exact same crime, i.e. stealing stereo equipment from 
an apartment (Supp. hearing p. 14). Officer Hanks pulled 
over to the side of the road and appellant, voluntarily 
pulled up behind him (T-38). There was absolutely no 
force or authority involved. There was no siren, flashing 
lights, or even a motion by the officer to pull over. 
The action was completely voluntary on the part of 
appellant. After pulling over, co-defendant, Davis, 
approached the police car walking rapidly as if he 
didn't want the officer to walk back to the van 
(Supp. hearing p. 8); again, instead of waiting in 
his van to see what the officer wanted, voluntarily 
initiating further interaction. After some conversation 
the officer asked the co-defendant what they were doing; 
he replied that he had been visiting a friend. Appellant 
did not know that the officer had had them under surveillance 
for quite a while. However, the officer knew that either 
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they were telling the truth and it had been a very short 
visit, or else appellant and the co-defendant had been 
doing something else at those apartments that takes 
only a very short time. The officer then asked appellant 
for some identification and he pulled his driver's 
license out of his sock (Supp. hearing p. 9). The 
officer then asked appellant whether he had recently 
been arrested in Price, knowing already that he had 
been. Appellant lied and said he had not, but there-
after admitted the arrest when he realized he had been 
caught in a lie (Supp. hearing p. 11). Finally, 
while talking with the co-defendant, the Officer noticed 
stereo equipment in the back of the van. The co-
defendant, realizing that the officer had observed the 
stereo components, immediately volunteered the remark 
that he didn't know anything about anything in the 
van (T-37,60). This was not in answer to any question 
but was totally unsolicited. 
In light of all of these circumstances and the 
additional fact that: Officer Hanks was a highly ex-
perienced police officer, he clearly had good cause 
to have back up officers detain appellant for another 
brief moment while he made a quick check on the 
nearby apartment from which appellant had just come. 
Using the words of the Utah State Supreme Court, 
Officer Hanks was maintaining the status quo momen-
_ T 1 — 
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tarily while obtaining more information. Respondent 
submits that the Officer's actions were constitutionally 
permissible and highly reasonable in light of the 
facts in his possession. As the United State Supreme 
Court said: 
"The Fourth Amendment does not 
require a policeman who lacks the 
precise level of information necessary 
for probable cause to arrest to simply 
shrug his shoulders and allow a 
crime to occur or a criminal to 
escape. On the contrary, Terry 
recognizes that it may be the 
essence of good police work to 
adopt an intermediate response 
• • • •" Adams v. Williamsy supra. 
Respondent further submits that this case is 
controlled by the case of State v. Torres, supra. In 
that case, a police officer stopped a car with two 
men in it for no other reason that it was in the 
vicinity of a crime scene. The crime had only been 
committed by one man. Nevertheless, the conviction 
of one of the men in the car was upheld. The police 
officer in the Torres case had much less reason to 
stop Torres, than Officer Hanks to detain appellant. The 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
" . . . it is essential that a 
reasonable degree of tolerance be 
indulged as to the judgment of 
police officers, so long as they 
are acting in good faith and within 
the standards of decent and decorous 
behavior." 508 P.2d at 536. 
Furthermore: 
" . . . justifiable suspicion 
of a police officer affords a 
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proper constitutional basis for 
stopping a person and momentarily 
restraining the person's freedom 
" Td 
• • • • JL\-1 • 
Respondent submits that appellant's conviction should 
be affirmed, 
POINT II 
OFFICER HANKS HAD AMPLE PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
ARREST THE DEFENDANT AS REQUIRED BY THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
The Fourth Amendment protections of the 
United States Constitution originated to guard 
against highhanded and ruthless intrusions against 
persons, homes and property by officials of an 
oppressive government. Article I, Section 14 of the 
Constitution of the State of Utah is nearly identical 
to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution in its language protecting against unreason-
able searches and seizures: both require probable 
cause as discussed, supra, in Point I. 
The United States Supreme Court defined 
probable cause in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 
132, 69 L.Ed.2d 543, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925): 
"This is to say that the facts 
and circumstances within their know-
ledge and of which they had reasonably 
trustworthy information were sufficient 
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in themselves to warrant a man of 
reasonable caution in the belief 
that intoxicating liquor was 
being transported in the auto-
mobile which they stopped and 
searched." 267 U.S. at 162. 
The problem suggested by Carroll is that 
at some point in the factual chain, mere suspicion 
evolves into probable cause, and it is at that 
3 
point that an arrest can be made legally. The 
Court discussed at length how to determine when 
probable cause exists: 
"That line necessarily must be 
drawn by an act of judgment formed 
in the light of the particular sit-
uation and with account take of 
all circumstances. 338 U.S. at 
17 6. In dealing with probable 
cause, however, as the very name 
implies, we deal with probabilities. 
These are not technical; they are 
the factual and practical consid-
erations of everyday life on 
which reasonable and prudent men, 
not legal technicians, act. The 
standard of proof is accordingly 
correlative to what must be 
proved." 338 U.S. at 175. 
The Court in Brinegar recognized that the 
proof of probable cause is not proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, because so strict a standard would 
render much law enforcement ineffective* 
I n
 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 
93 L.Ed.2d 1879, 69 S.Ct. 1302 (1949). 
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The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed 
this standard in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
43 L.Ed.2d 54, 95 S.Ct. 854, on remand 511 F.2d 
528: 
"The standard for arrest is 
probable cause, defined in terms of 
facts and circumstances 'sufficient 
to warrant a prudent man in believing 
that the [suspect] had committed 
or was committing an offense.1 . . . 
This standard, like those for searches 
and seizures, represents a necessary 
accomodation between the individual's 
right to liberty and the State's duty 
to control crime. Gerstein v. Pugh, 
420 U.S. at 111, 112. 
Utah is also sensitive to the balancing 
interests of Fourth Amendment protections and reason-
able effective law enforcement: 
"No right-thinking person would 
desire to minimize or disparage the 
protections thus assured. But it 
is equally important that such 
protections be applied in circum-
stances they were intended to cover 
and that they do not become so 
extended beyond their reasons for 
being that even where there is no 
danger or liklihood of any such 
abuse, they provide a cloak of 
protection by which those engaged in 
criminal activities may escape detec-
tion and punishment. The essential 
thing is to keep within the reasonable 
middle ground, between the protecting 
of the lawabiding citizenry from high-
handed and officious intrusions 
into their private affairs; and the 
imposing of undue restrictions upon 
conscientious officers doing their 
duty in the investigation of crime," 
State v. Criscola, 21 Utah 2d 272, 
274, 275, 444 P.2d 517, 518, 519 (1968). 
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As a practical matter, Deputy Hanks1 ten 
years of experience as deputy sheriff should be 
taken into consideration in determining the existence 
of probable cause. Not only did he have ten years 
of experience on the force; but at the time of the 
arrest he was a detective in the special tactical 
division (T-36); and he has estimated he was in-
volved in about 100 arrests and investigations of this 
of this kind (T-52). Such experience made him 
sensitive to observable suspicious activity. 
Terry v. Ohio, supra, includes the officer's ex-
perience to aid in determining whether his search 
was reasonable. 
Although Deputy Hanks did not have probable 
cause to arrest the appellant and Walker while at 
the van as discussed supra, in Point I, he did 
have probable cause to detain them briefly. At 
that point Hanks went to the nearby apartment com-
plex to investigate. There he discovered a door to 
an apartment open about a footand a half, splintered 
and broken wood about the door, and the door exhibited 
pry marks on it about a half inch wide. He looked 
inside and observed a lamp overtruned and the apart-
ment in apparent disarray. With this information and 
in light of the facts he already knew: 
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(1) co-defendant had a previous arrest and 
conviction of burglary of an apartment? 
(2) appellant had a previous arrest; 
(3) appellant and co-defendant had been out of 
his view for about twelve minutes; 
(4) the van had pulled out of an apartment 
complex; 
(5) appellant had pulled the van over to the 
curb without being ordered to do so; 
(6) co-defendant got out of the van and walked 
quickly to Hanks1 car; 
(7) appellant pulled his driver's license out 
of his sock; 
(8) there was stereo equipment in the back 
of the van; and 
(9) after Hanks saw the equipment, co-defendant 
stated he knew nothing about it - an unsolicited state-
ment. 
Deputy Hanks had more than sufficient probable cause 
to arrest and his actions were proper and in accordance 
with Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-3 (Supp. 1971): 
"A peace officer may make an 
arrest in obedience to a warrant 
delivered to him; or may, without 
a warrant, arrest a person: 
(4) When a felony has in fact 
been committed, and he has reasonable 
cause for believing the person 
arrested to have committed it." 
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In fact, Deputy Hanks had more facts before him 
than did the police in State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 
2d .124, 499 P.2d 276 (1972). In that case a Nephi 
police officer observed car lights flash on and a 
car drive away from a medical clinic parking lot at 
3:00 a.m. He stopped the car and questioned its 
occupants - three teenage boys - none of whom he 
apparently knew personally or knew had any police 
record, then allowed them to proceed. The officer 
then went to the clinic; while investigating, he 
discovered a broken window and an unlocked door. 
He radioed to other units to have the auto stopped 
and the occupants arrested. In Eastmond, this Court 
held there wcis probable cause for the arrest. 
It is important to note that prior to their 
actual arrest the Nephi officer did not have any 
more evidence that a crime actually had been committed 
than did Deputy Hanks. Also, Eastmond goes further 
than the case at bar because in Eastmond prior to 
the request to arrest the defendants the Nephi officer 
had not seen any suspicious items in the car, as 
did Deputy Hanks. In Eastmond it was only after the 
occupants were arrested that the "doctor's bag" and 
items items were observed. 
-18-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant cites People v. Miller, 7 Ca. 3d 
219, 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1972) in 
support of his position, claiming that electronic 
equipment seen in the back of Miller's automobile was 
not, in itself sufficient to support an inference that 
it was contraband. The police suspected a burglary 
when they saw the electronic equipment in his back 
seat, and they wanted to take custody of it. Defendant 
refused and the police took it anyway. They later 
discovered marijuana. The holding in Miller was 
that the police may not use a refusal to waive 
Fourth Amendment rights into a "suspicious" activity 
evidencing criminal conduct. In Miller the officers 
only knew that the defendant was asleep in his car 
at a late hour, that he had equipment in the back of 
his car and that he had an outstanding traffic warrant. 
Unlike the case at bar, the police had no evidence 
whatsoever of any offense even tenuously related to 
Miller to suspect him of burglary, there was not any 
evidence of a criminal background of burglary by 
Miller and no suspicious behavior by Miller to avoid 
detection of possible criminal conduct. 
Appellant also cites Remers v. Superior Court 
of Alameda County, 2 Cal. 3d 659, 470 P.2d 11, 87 
Cal. Rptr. 202 (1970). The distinguishing factor in 
Remers was that the arresting officer had no knowledge 
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of the defendant's previous criminal record either 
reliably or first-hand. The Court in Renters was 
primarily concerned with protecting against the 
manufacture of criminal records to help get probable 
cause. This is not the case with the appellant's 
arrest; here Deputy Hanks himself had previously 
arrested the appellant on a burglary chargef so 
this plus all of the other surrounding circumstances 
clearly gave Hanks probable cause to arrest the 
appellant. 
There is no question that an arrest requires 
probable cause, but just what constitutes probable 
cause is subject to interpretation. The United 
States Supreme Court in Henry v. United States, supra, 
held that the arresting officer did not have probable 
cause to arrest the defendant where they: 
(1) did not know defendant; 
(2) did not have more than mere suspicion 
regarding defendant's companion; 
(3) defendant had no previous criminal record; and 
(4) observed defendant engaging in totally 
outwardly innocent activities (i.e. riding in a car, 
stopping in an alley, picking up packages, and driving 
away). 
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In this case, Deputy Hanks knew of the appellant1s 
previous criminal activity, plus he observed suspicious 
conduct by the two suspects, plus he had reasonable 
grounds for believing an apartment had been broken 
into, plus he observed the stereo equipment in the 
van, plus he received the unsolicited statement from 
the appellant disclaiming knowledge about the stereo. 
Taking the surrounding circumstances as a whole, 
Carroll v. United States, supra, Deputy Hanks clearly 
had probable cause for arresting the appellant and 
Walker. 
POINT III 
IN LIGHT OF THE LAWFUL ARREST OF THE APPELLANT 
THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED THROUGH THE TWO SEARCH WARRANTS 
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE. 
Respondent concedes the validity of the "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" doctrine but contends that it 
does not apply in this case. The appellant's arrest 
was lawful; therefore his Point III has no application. 
Further, appellant does not question the structural 
validity of the two search warrants, and since they 
were issued properly and with probable cause, the 
requirements of valid warrants have been met. 
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It is only to Deputy Hanks' credit that he 
obtained these warrants at all, because the searches 
and seizure of the van would have been valid even 
without warrants. In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 
42, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 90 S.Ct. 1975, rehearing denied 
400 U.S. 856, 27 L.Ed.2d 94, 91 S.Ct. 23 (1970), a 
warrantless search of an automobile after it was 
taken to a police station was held constitutional 
where (1) there was probable cause to arrest the 
occupants of the automobile and to search the auto-
mobile for weapons and contraband, (2) an immediate 
search of the automobile at the time and place of 
the arrest would have been constitutionally permissible, 
and (3) it was not unreasonable to take the automobile 
to the police station before making the search, and 
probable cause for the search still existed after the 
automobile was taken to the police station. Chambers 
v. Maroney, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The investigation conducted by Deputy Hanks 
was entirely reasonable and based on the requisite 
sufficient cause; and he had probable cause to arrest 
the appellant after discovering the burglarized 
apartment. The eivdence obtained was based on a 
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clearly legal arrest and was properly admitted into 
evidence at trial. The conviction of the appellant 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON E. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RECEIVED 
LAW LIBRARY 
1 \ JUN1977 
BRIGhXl YOUNG UNIVERSITY 
J. Rcubzn Ci^ rii L w School 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
